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Note
Stimulating Dialogue Between the Courts and
Congress: Sprucing Up the “Statutory
Housekeeping” Project
Jeff Simard*
Although the federal statutory housekeeping project has
1
existed since the 1990s, this little-known interbranch communication project has a great deal of untapped potential. The project calls for United States courts of appeals to voluntarily
submit opinions from court decisions discussing technical flaws
2
in statutes to Congress. The circuit courts send the opinions
themselves, without substantial commentary from their authors or court staff, to a variety of offices in the legislative
branch that may then take whatever actions they see fit in re3
sponse to the opinions.
Professors Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman’s recent survey of legislative drafters suggests that judges and leg-
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to respond to that survey. I would especially like to thank Russell Wheeler for
providing recent data about the statutory housekeeping project and offering
his thoughts about the project and this Note, and M. Douglass Bellis and Matthew Lee Wiener for their insights about the statutory housekeeping project. A
special thanks also goes to the staff of the Minnesota Law Review for helping
prepare this Note for publication, and to my brother, Justin, for his immensely
helpful feedback throughout the researching, writing, and editing process. Finally, I would like to thank my family for all of their support during law
school. Copyright © 2015 by Jeff Simard.
1. Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, A Mechanism for “Statutory Housekeeping”: Appellate Courts Working with Congress, 9 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 131, 133–36 (2007) (describing the procedure of the federal statutory
housekeeping project).
2. Id. at 136–38 (same).
3. Id.
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islative drafters read and understand statutes differently, yet
their study does not devote any time to the federal statutory
5
housekeeping project, one mechanism that already exists for
improving interbranch communication. If used properly, the
project stands to foster communication between judges and
drafters, encourage forward-thinking draftsmanship, and improve statutory interpretation.
In its current form, however, the project is insufficient.
6
Participation is weak and uneven among the circuits, and recent attempts at revitalization have not led to broader partici7
pation. Recipients of opinions submitted through the project
8
find them helpful, but they use them merely as a training tool
rather than as a way to promote dialogue between the judiciary
9
and Congress as was initially intended.
This Note argues that the federal statutory housekeeping
project can realize its potential as a tool for effective
interbranch communication only if properly reformed and expanded. Part I introduces the federal statutory housekeeping
project, tracing its development from the project’s historical
roots to its present day structure. Based partially on interviews
with those affected by and involved in the federal project, Part
II analyzes contemporary use of the project, ultimately arguing
that its infrequent use and narrow focus limit its ability to
promote communication and improve statutes. In Part III, this
4. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation,
and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 933–40 (2013) (describing how
the commonly followed judicial statutory canon of the rule against superfluities, the whole act and whole code rules, and the judicial use of dictionaries to
determine plain meaning usually do not reflect legislative drafting practice).
5. See id.
6. See Memorandum from Russell Wheeler, President, The Governance
Inst., to author (Sept. 12, 2013) (on file with author) (providing a breakdown of
court participation in the federal statutory housekeeping project since 2007).
7. See, e.g., Feedback on Technical Matters Aids Legislation, THIRD
BRANCH, Feb. 2010, at 4, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/News/
TheThirdBranch/TTBViewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/news/ttb/archive/2010
-02%20Feb.pdf [hereinafter Feedback] (publicizing the federal statutory
housekeeping project).
8. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, Senior Counsel, Office
of the Legislative Counsel, United States House of Representatives (Sept. 24,
2013); E-mail from Russell Wheeler, President, The Governance Inst., to author (Sept. 19, 2013, 10:31 CDT) (on file with author).
9. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (discussing
how the project helps develop legislative counsel drafting techniques rather
than generate individual congressional legislative responses).
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Note draws lessons from state interbranch communication programs. It proposes increasing two-way feedback between judges
and legislators within the housekeeping project, formalizing it,
and supplementing the project with educational programs. This
Note concludes that a three-part solution would greatly help
the federal statutory housekeeping project realize its potential,
bridge the gap between judicial statutory interpretation and
legislative drafting, and improve relations between the federal
Judiciary and Congress.
I. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FEDERAL STATUTORY HOUSEKEEPING PROJECT
The federal statutory housekeeping project draws inspiration from earlier work describing how weak interbranch com10
munications exacerbate technical flaws in statutes. This early
work explains why the statutory housekeeping project exists
and provides a way to measure its success. Section A of this
Part notes how action by a single branch cannot solve the problem of gaps and defects in statutes. Section B traces the development of the D.C. Circuit pilot version of the housekeeping
project, detailing how its founders envisioned and developed
the project as a response to the issues discussed in Section A.
Section C then describes the current structure of the housekeeping project, setting the stage for Part II’s analysis of the
project’s usage and effectiveness today.
A. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEMS OF STATUTORY DEFECTS
AND LACKLUSTER INTERBRANCH COMMUNICATION
The federal statutory housekeeping project developed from
11
prior attempts to improve interbranch communication. As early as 1921, Benjamin Cardozo noted that “courts and legisla12
tures work in separation and aloofness.” Cardozo argued that
when legislatures created ambiguous legislation, they invited
judges to engage in their own sort of lawmaking to try to make
13
sense out of confusing statutes. According to Cardozo, the
10. E.g., Robert A. Katzmann, Madison Lecture, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 637, 686–87 (2012); Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 131–32.
11. See supra note 10.
12. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 113
(1921).
13. See id. at 115–16 (discussing the idea that leaving statutory ambiguities to judges causes them to create judge-made law which can result in more
uncertainties).
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problem with this implicit delegation was not just that judgemade law itself can be difficult to shape, but also that the original “ugly or antiquated or unjust rule” that created the predicament in the first place remains even after judges try to make
14
good of it. Thus, while remedying this root issue requires legislative action, getting legislatures to fix statutory flaws is incredibly difficult because courts and legislatures isolate them15
selves from each other.
Dean Roscoe Pound elaborated upon the problem of statutory defects, situating it within Congress’s modernized lawmaking environment. Pound noted that as laws grew increasingly
complex, discovering and proposing a solution to a statutory de16
fect became the province of experts, making reform harder.
Moreover, the incentives of modern lawmaking did not favor
statutory reform. The revision of relatively low-key provisions
of private law would neither garner legislators much publicity,
17
nor generate favors from other legislators. Since legislators
were often focused on what appeared to be more pressing and
timely concerns, they rarely considered how judges would in18
terpret that legislation in the future. Other times, legislation
would pass without an in-depth review because of interest
19
group pressure. Pound, linking his analysis with Cardozo’s
discussion, noted how this lack of legislative foresight encour20
aged judicial freewheeling in statutory interpretation. Writing
a decade after Pound, Judge Friendly explained how statutory
21
gaps and defects obscure the boundaries of judicial action. To
the extent that statutes were intended to limit judicial discretion, or operate in its place, statutory flaws created a problem
22
that judges were unequipped to solve. In that sense, legislatures diminished the role of judges insofar as they “occup[ied]
14. Id. at 116; see Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking—Judges
Who Can’t and Legislators Who Won’t, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 798–99 (1963)
(“Sometimes, when the ambiguity is confined, a court’s construction of a statute can set matters right for good and all. But generally, the best the judge
can do is to keep the ship afloat, in better shape or worse, in the hope that rescue will arrive.”).
15. See Cardozo, supra note 12, at 113–14, 116.
16. Roscoe Pound, A Ministry of Justice: A New Role for the Law School,
38 A.B.A. J. 637, 638 (1952).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 703.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Friendly, supra note 14, at 792.
22. Id.
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vast fields” of the law with statutes, but failed to “keep them
ploughed” by addressing the problems caused by their plethora
23
of statutes. Indeed, many of these statutory problems were
24
long-standing. Yet, the reason for the absence of legislative
improvement of statutes was not strong opposition, but a lack
25
of time and attention.
B. THE D.C. PILOT STATUTORY HOUSEKEEPING PROJECT
Informed by the critiques of Cardozo, Pound, Friendly, and
others, the federal statutory housekeeping project began as a
26
pilot program initiated at the invitation of the D.C. Circuit.
1. Genesis of the D.C. Pilot Program
A study conducted by Judge Frank Coffin, Robert
27
Katzmann, and the Governance Institute laid the groundwork
28
for the D.C. Circuit pilot project. The study focused on fifteen
opinions selected by D.C. Circuit judges that described technical errors in statutes such as grammatical problems, mis29
placed commas, ambiguities, and gaps. Coffin and Katzmann
categorized these opinions and Katzmann sent them, along
with related legislative history, to the relevant legislative staff30
ers on various committees. In interviews, Katzmann discov23. See id. (“What I do lament is that the legislator has diminished the
role of the judge by occupying vast fields and then has failed to keep them
ploughed.”).
24. See id. at 793–95 (mentioning examples of statutes with long-standing
technical flaws).
25. Id. at 793 (“Yet most of the questions involved, although debatable,
are not of the sort as to which the opposing forces are so evenly balanced as to
prevent legislative change; the problem is rather lack of time and attention.”).
26. Robert A. Katzmann & Stephanie M. Herseth, An Experiment in Statutory Communication Between Courts and Congress: A Progress Report, 85
GEO. L.J. 2189, 2192 (1997).
27. “The Governance Institute is a small non-profit, non-partisan organization that since its 1986 incorporation in Washington, D.C. has explored and
sought to ease specific problems associated with both the separation and division of powers in the American federal system.” About, THE GOVERNANCE
INST., http://www.thegovernanceinstitute.org/about (last visited Nov. 17,
2014). The Governance Institute largely focuses on problems in the administration of justice, particularly those related to relations between the courts
and Congress, and problems of the administrative state. Id.
28. Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the D.C. Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 323–25 (1989); Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at
2192–93.
29. 124 F.R.D. at 323; Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2192.
30. 124 F.R.D. at 323.
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ered that congressional staffers generally only paid close attention to major cases and were unaware of twelve out of the fif31
teen court decisions.
After analyzing the results of the Governance Institute
study, Katzmann, Coffin, and others at the Governance Institute came to understand that both branches supported some
32
means of conveying relevant judicial opinions to Congress.
33
They envisioned that “transmission belt of sorts” as low-key.
In order to facilitate the correction of technical errors, the solution needed to be respectful of the prerogatives of both branch34
es, relatively unburdensome, and technically sound. With these concerns in mind, the D.C. Circuit and the Governance
Institute worked together with key participants in the U.S.
35
House to build an interbranch communication project and
36
launched it in 1992 to a warm reception by the Judiciary and
37
Congress. It would come to be informally known as the “statutory housekeeping” project based on then Judge Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s earlier description of the need to clean up statutory
38
drafting flaws.
2. An Early Progress Report
The D.C. Circuit pilot housekeeping project depended on
39
participation from both the judicial and legislative sides. As
designed, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals would transmit
40
41
opinions concerning grammatical errors, ambiguities, and
31. Id. at 323–24.
32. Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2193–94.
36. The project was first launched by the House and was implemented by
the Senate a few months later. Id. at 2194.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2189–90 n.3 (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber,
The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1428 (1987)).
39. See Katzmann, supra note 10, at 687–94 (discussing the statutory
housekeeping project in the context of interbranch communication regarding
statutes); Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2190 (describing how the
project was “committed to the view that improved communication between the
branches would improve the work of both branches”).
40. M. Douglass Bellis, Commentary, A View from the House of Representatives, 85 GEO. L.J. 2209, 2210 (1997).
41. Id. at 2211–12. Bellis also noted that “[m]any ambiguities in statutory
language arise from political compromises, which are inevitably part of the
democratic process” and that the statutory housekeeping project “serves as a
useful means for political actors to discover whose interpretation prevailed”
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43

gaps in statutes to Congress. The program assigned responsibility not to judges but to the D.C. Circuit’s clerk and staff attorneys to determine which opinions should be submitted to
44
Congress. Over time, the D.C. Circuit clerk of court and staff
attorneys began to develop filtering mechanisms to make this
45
process easier. These filtering mechanisms resulted in the
submission of a relatively small number of opinions discussing
46
statutory defects.
The chosen opinions were received and addressed by the
47
Offices of Legislative Counsel in the House and Senate, bodies
that operate on an attorney-client relationship with legislators
48
and legislative staff and assist in statute drafting. The two
Legislative Counsel offices used the opinions as case studies for
the training of staff and as a basis for reviewing and redevelop49
ing drafting rules. The Legislative Counsel offices also sent
50
the chosen opinions to relevant committees.
Usage of the submitted opinions in Congress was limited:
Members of Congress took no legislative action in response to
when a provision was drafted with two competing interpretations in mind. Id.
at 2211 n.10.
42. Id. at 2212–13.
43. Id. at 2209.
44. Mark J. Langer, Commentary, Implementing the Project: A Court Administrator’s Role, 85 GEO. L.J. 2219, 2219 (1997).
45. Id. at 2219–20. For example, statutory construction cases featuring
divided panels or a divided en banc court often would end up qualifying for the
project, while cases where the Court deferred to an agency’s interpretation
were normally omitted from submission. Id.
46. Id. at 2220–21 (noting that implementing the project did not impose a
heavy burden on staff attorneys and that relatively few opinions were submitted).
47. See Bellis, supra note 40, at 2210 (explaining how House legislative
counsels were responsible for sending opinions to the appropriate committee
staff); Frank Burk, Commentary, Statutory Housekeeping: A Senate Perspective, 85 GEO. L.J. 2217, 2217 (1997) (describing how the Senate Legislative
Counsel’s Office found the project helpful and played a role in transmitting
opinions to the relevant committee staff).
48. See Burk, supra note 47, at 2218 (“Because the Senate Legislative
Counsel’s Office has an attorney-client relationship with the committees, it
could report on the project only with the express consent of the committees involved.”).
49. Id. at 2217 (describing how the project prompted a two-year review of
drafting rules used by the Senate Legislative Counsel’s Office, led to the development of drafting manual, and provided case studies for the training of
staff); see Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (noting
that the federal statutory housekeeping project was used for training staff in
the House Legislative Counsel’s Office).
50. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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51

the D.C. Circuit opinions and committee use of the opinions
52
was varied and uneven. In turn, key participants in the program recommended reevaluating the criteria for choosing opin53
ions and developing a more two-sided communication pro54
cess.
The Congressional Legislative Counsel offices, however,
found the project helpful. They used the opinions to identify
problems that past drafting had caused for judicial statutory
55
interpretation and to improve drafting procedures. For them,
the project was not about “find[ing] ‘mistakes’ that Congress
[had] made and should correct,” but rather opening communication so that “Congress can learn how the courts are reacting
56
to and interpreting statutes.” Observers of the D.C. pilot project found the relatively simple structure of the project appeal57
ing. It neither consumed judges’ time nor distracted legisla58
tors from their most important duties. Instead, the project
was directed at those in the legislative branch most concerned
with the technical details of statutes, the Legislative Counsels,
who could give the opinions the time and attention they de59
served. Based on these perceived advantages of the pilot program, participants suggested expanding it to cover all of the
60
U.S. courts of appeals.
51. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2213.
52. Burk, supra note 47, at 2217.
53. See id. at 2218 (“It may be time to reassess the project’s guidelines.”).
54. See Bellis, supra note 40, at 2214 (arguing that communication between the branches should be a two-way street); see also Proceedings of the
Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the D.C. Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 324
(1989) (explaining that legislative staff believed it would be helpful if the
courts could be informed of any actions taken by Congress in response to submitted opinions).
55. See Bellis, supra note 40, at 2213; see also Burk, supra note 48, at
2217 (“From the perspective of the office responsible for much of the legislative
drafting done in the Senate, the project has been a success, although perhaps
not quite in the way those who developed the project expected.”).
56. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2213.
57. James L. Buckley, Commentary, The Perspective of a Judge and Former Legislator, 85 GEO. L.J. 2223, 2224 (1997) (“The [statutory housekeeping]
project’s virtue is its simplicity.”).
58. See id. (describing how the structure of the project suits judges and
members of Congress).
59. See id. (discussing how those in charge of drafting statutes, the two
Legislative Counsel’s offices, were in favor of the project).
60. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2213–14 (listing examples of statutory flaws
that judges encounter in other circuits to suggest that it would be helpful to
expand the project); Buckley, supra note 57, at 2224 (“In light of the Judicial
Conference’s recommendation that all circuits join the project, I would think
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C. CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE PROJECT
Today, over fifteen years after the federal statutory housekeeping project was expanded, the project has retained a simi61
lar structure to that of the D.C. pilot program. Depending on
the circuit court, either the clerk of the court, staff attorneys, or
62
judges identify appropriate opinions to be sent to Congress.
These individuals have flexibility in the identification process
since there is no strict definition of which opinions may be
submitted; rather, there is a general guideline that they address grammatical errors, ambiguities, or gaps in statutory
63
provisions.
Once identified, the clerk of the court sends the opinion to
the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the
Senate, and submits copies to the Judiciary committees, the
House and Senate Offices of Legislative Counsel, the General
Counsel of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and
64
the Governance Institute. The opinions are submitted without
substantive commentary to avoid inappropriate extrajudicial
65
action.
The Legislative Counsel offices pay the most attention to
66
the submitted opinions. After receiving an e-mail with an
opinion, a Senior Legislative Counsel reads the case and identifies the major statutory drafting issue or issues implicated by
the time is ripe for other courts to consider participating.”); see Katzmann &
Herseth, supra note 26, at 2195 (mentioning the Judicial Conference’s recommendation and noting that the First, Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have
also expressed interest in the project); Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at
134 (noting then Chief Justice Rehnquist’s endorsement of the pilot project in
1993).
61. Compare discussion of pilot project’s structure, supra Part I.B.2, with
Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 136–38 (explaining the federal statutory housekeeping project’s current procedure on the judicial side), and Bellis,
supra note 40 (explaining the statutory housekeeping project’s current procedure on the legislative side).
62. Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 136. For more information regarding the different methods of administering the project, see infra note 100
and accompanying text.
63. Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 136–37.
64. Id. at 137.
65. One suggested letter template simply states, “Enclosed please find an
opinion of the United States Courts of Appeals for XXX Circuit, which may be
of interest to the Congress.” Id. at 137 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (discussing
how members of Congress rarely read judicial opinions and few members are
particularly concerned with the intricacies of statutory language that are the
domain of the Legislative Counsel’s offices).
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67

68

it. After confirming the drafting issue with the clerk of court,
the Senior Legislative Counsel gives the opinion to the Staff
Legislative Counsel who specializes in the area of law at issue,
and to the relevant subcommittee staff counsel for his or her
69
consideration.
Early articulations of the link between technical flaws in
statutes and lackluster interbranch communication played a
key role in shaping the purpose and structure of the federal
70
statutory housekeeping project. That project received largely
positive feedback from Congress and the judiciary during its
launch in pilot form in 1992 and from key participants in the
71
project several years later. Yet, shortfalls of the project pointed out during its pilot stage have largely been unaddressed
even as it has been expanded to include all of the circuits. Low
participation in the project suggests that the statutory housekeeping project is not serving the function of an interbranch
72
“transmission belt” today as its supporters hoped it would
73
when it launched fifteen years ago.
II. THE FEDERAL STATUTORY HOUSEKEEPING
PROJECT’S UNREALIZED POTENTIAL
The federal statutory housekeeping project’s ability to address the problems associated with lackluster interbranch
communications depends on the participation of the federal judiciary and Congress. Participation, however, has been weak
and inconsistent, preventing the project from reaching its potential.
Section A of this Part evaluates recent judicial participation in the federal statutory housekeeping project, concludes
that such participation is both low and uneven, and suggests
several possible explanations for the lack of participation. Section B addresses usage of the project by legislators and legislative counsels, argues that legislative use of the project is fairly
narrow in focus, and offers potential reasons for that narrow
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Katzmann, supra note 10, at 686–88 (linking earlier proposals regarding statutory revision and interbranch communication with the federal statutory housekeeping project).
71. See supra notes 36–37, 55–60 and accompanying text.
72. Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193.
73. See infra Part II.
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usage. Section C then explains why low rates of participation
are disconcerting by articulating the importance of interbranch
communication. It argues, however, that the federal statutory
housekeeping project could be an effective tool of interbranch
dialogue if used properly.
A. JUDICIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE FEDERAL STATUTORY
HOUSEKEEPING PROJECT IS LOW AND UNEVEN
The federal statutory housekeeping project does not enjoy
broad judicial participation. Rather, judicial engagement in the
project is low and uneven, likely because of a general lack of
knowledge of the project and concerns about whether it is appropriate for judges to take part in it. This relative lack of judicial participation limits the project’s reach and hinders its effectiveness.
1. Participation Among the Circuits
74

From July 2007 to August 2014, nine courts of appeals
submitted forty-six opinions to Congress through the federal
75
76
statutory housekeeping project. Of these forty-six opinions,

74. July 2007 represents the beginning of efforts to revitalize the statutory housekeeping project. Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 134–35.
75. E-mail from Russell Wheeler, President, The Governance Inst., to author (Aug. 12, 2014, 14:57 CST) (on file with author); see also Memorandum
from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 1.
76. The submitted opinions discussed technical defects in statutes relating to immigration, bankruptcy, commerce and trade, criminal law, food and
drug regulation, judicial procedure, and labor. Memorandum from Russell
Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 2–6. See, e.g., Sterk v. Redbox Automated
Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d 535, 537–39 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing whether violating subsection (d) of the Video Privacy Protection Act may give rise to civil actions authorized under subsection (c) of that statute); Delrio-Mooci v. Connolly
Props., Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 248–51 (3d Cir. 2012) (interpreting the breadth of a
statute criminalizing encouraging or inducing aliens to illegally enter or reside
in the United States); United States v. Vasquez, 611 F.3d 325, 327–29 (7th
Cir. 2010) (determining whether a conviction for failure to register under the
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act requires evidence that the defendant knew of this federal obligation); Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v.
IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 615–18 (9th Cir. 2010) (pointing out an
ambiguity as to whether a copyright is registered when the Copyright Office
receives a copyright application or when the Copyright Office issues a certificate of registration); United States v. Hassan, 542 F.3d 968, 978–80 (2d Cir.
2008) (discussing whether the Controlled Substance Act is unconstitutionally
vague for failing to use khat’s common name when prohibiting that substance); Zedan v. Habash, 529 F.3d 398, 403–05 (7th Cir. 2008) (highlighting a
gap created by the Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Rules regarding the
timing of an objection to a debtor’s discharge).
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thirteen mentioned gaps in statutes, twenty-eight addressed
77
ambiguities, and one highlighted a grammatical error.
According to a number of measures, forty-six submitted
opinions is a low rate of judicial participation in the housekeeping project. First, the forty-six submitted opinions cited thirty
other recent circuit court opinions discussing the same deficient
provisions—opinions that the courts could have submitted
78
through the project but did not. These thirty non-submitted
opinions are the clearest evidence for judicial underuse because
the statutory issues they discussed were eligible for submission
by other courts.
Second, the uneven submission of opinions suggests that
participation in some circuits is low. The Seventh Circuit was
responsible for slightly less than sixty percent of the submitted
79
opinions. Although judges in the Seventh Circuit generally
write published opinions in a greater percentage of merit de80
terminations than other courts of appeals, the next two courts
77. Memorandum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 2. The
four most recent opinions have not yet been categorized. See E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 75.
78. Memorandum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 1.
79. See E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 75.
80. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE S-3. U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS—TYPES OF OPINIONS OR ORDERS FILED IN CASES TERMINATED ON
THE MERITS AFTER ORAL HEARINGS OR SUBMISSION ON BRIEFS DURING THE
12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2012 (2013), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/tables/
S03Sep12.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE S-3. U.S. COURTS
OF APPEALS—TYPES OF OPINIONS OR ORDERS FILED IN CASES TERMINATED ON
THE MERITS AFTER ORAL HEARINGS OR SUBMISSION ON BRIEFS DURING THE
12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2011 (2012), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/tables/
S03Sep11.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE S-3. U.S. COURTS
OF APPEALS—TYPES OF OPINIONS OR ORDERS FILED IN CASES TERMINATED ON
THE MERITS AFTER ORAL HEARINGS OR SUBMISSION ON BRIEFS DURING THE
12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2010 (2011), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/tables/
S03Sep10.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE S-3. U.S. COURTS
OF APPEALS—TYPES OF OPINIONS OR ORDERS FILED IN CASES TERMINATED ON
THE MERITS AFTER ORAL HEARINGS OR SUBMISSION ON BRIEFS DURING THE
12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 (2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?
doc=/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/tables/S03Sep09.pdf;
ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE S-3. U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—TYPES OF
OPINIONS OR ORDERS FILED IN CASES TERMINATED ON THE MERITS AFTER
ORAL HEARINGS OR SUBMISSION ON BRIEFS DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD
ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts
.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2008/tables/S03Sep08.pdf;
ADMIN.
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by that measure, the First and D.C. Circuits, have submitted
81
two and zero opinions respectively since 2007. Even if for
some reason the Seventh Circuit encounters more technical defects in statutes, it is still difficult to explain why its judges
would see more than four times as many technical flaws in
82
statutes than any other circuit. If the other participating circuits see at least half as many of such cases as the Seventh Cir83
cuit does, and there is no clear reason why they would not, a
conservative estimate would be that there are potentially
eighty or more eligible opinions that have not been submitted.
Finally, a comparison of the number of opinions submitted
through the statutory housekeeping project from 2007 to 2014
to the number of opinions submitted through the pilot project
from 1992 to 1997 suggests that the project is being underused.
During the housekeeping project’s pilot project period, thirtyseven cases were submitted from a single circuit, an average of
84
over seven cases per eligible circuit per year. From 2007 to
2014, forty-six cases have been submitted, a much lower aver85
age, about one half of one case per eligible circuit per year.
Even if one ignores the circuits that have not submitted any
opinions since 2007, this comparison is still quite telling. The
total number of opinions submitted through the project from
2007 to the present by nine circuits is nearly as many as were
submitted by the D.C. Circuit alone during the project’s six86
year test run. Although an optimist might attribute the decline in submission rate to greater efforts by drafters to clean
up statutes, that possibility is unlikely. Statute-based law has
only become more predominant and judges continue to encoun87
ter ambiguous statutes on a frequent basis.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE S-3. U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—TYPES OF
OPINIONS OR ORDERS FILED IN CASES TERMINATED ON THE MERITS AFTER
ORAL HEARINGS OR SUBMISSION ON BRIEFS DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD
ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2007 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2007/tables/S03Sep07.pdf.
81. E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 75.
82. See E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8 (mentioning
that one reason why the Seventh Circuit submits more opinions than any other circuit is probably “not because it encounters more drafting problems than
other courts but rather because the chief judge is committed to the project as
is the clerk of court”).
83. Id.
84. Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2194–96.
85. E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 75.
86. Id.; Memorandum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 1.
87. See Katzmann, supra note 10, at 640, 643–45 (describing the preva-
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The uneven nature of judicial participation in the housekeeping project deserves greater attention because the effectiveness of the project is limited by both the low number of
submitted opinions and the lack of meaningful participation by
most circuits. As mentioned above, the Seventh Circuit currently submits the overwhelming majority of opinions in the project, behavior that can be explained more by the commitment of
its chief judge and clerk of court to the project than to a dispro88
portionate number of statutory issues in that particular court.
The Seventh Circuit’s relatively high participation in the project contrasts sharply with the zero opinions that four of the
thirteen federal courts of appeals have submitted since July
89
2007. Even if one were to discount the lack of participation by
the Federal Circuit based on its slightly different focus, there is
no clear reason why the Sixth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits would
90
not have encountered any eligible statutory flaws. The D.C.
Circuit’s failure to submit any opinions is particularly notable
in light of its role in the creation of the federal statutory house91
keeping project and the Circuit’s substantial administrative
92
law jurisprudence. Its lack of participation in the project today
prevents many important decisions discussing statutory flaws
in the context of administrative law from being transmitted to
93
Congress.
It is possible to argue that the participating circuits’ opinions discuss many of the same statutory provisions and thus
that the lack of participation by the Sixth, Eighth, and Federal
Circuits does not hamper the effectiveness of the project overall. The aforementioned fact that forty-six submitted opinions
cited at least thirty other non-transmitted circuit court opinlence of statutory law and the frequency with which federal judges engage in
statutory interpretation).
88. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
89. E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 75.
90. See id. (listing which circuits have participated in the statutory
housekeeping project); E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8
(suggesting that the reason for a lack of submitted opinions is not due to a disparity in the number of encountered flaws).
91. Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2194–96. See generally Langer, supra note 44 (detailing the D.C. Circuit’s implementation of the pilot project).
92. See Telephone Interview with Matthew Lee Wiener, Exec. Dir., Admin. Conference of the U.S. (Sept. 17, 2013) (mentioning that the D.C. Circuit
makes many decisions addressing administrative law issues).
93. Id. (noting that from an administrative law perspective, it would be
helpful to include D.C. Circuit opinions in the statutory housekeeping project).
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ions discussing the same statutory sections could be construed
94
to support that argument. However, it is difficult to claim that
the housekeeping project is really an effective “transmission
95
belt” when only some of the circuits participate in it and even
96
then only rarely.
2. Possible Reasons for Limited Judicial Participation
The relatively low and uneven rates of judicial participation in the housekeeping project likely stem from three major
factors: (1) lack of information about the project; (2) failure to
prioritize participation; and (3) concerns about separation of
97
powers and inappropriate judicial communication. All of these
factors, however, can be addressed with appropriate reforms.
Perhaps the most obvious reason for the lack of broad judicial participation in the statutory housekeeping project is the
project’s obscurity. Despite a series of efforts to publicize the
98
project since 2007, there is some evidence that some judges
simply are not acquainted with the project or knowledgeable
99
about how it works. In circuits where judges are primarily re100
sponsible for selecting which opinions are submitted, this
94. E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 75; see also Memorandum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 1.
95. Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193.
96. E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 75; see also Memorandum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 1.
97. See Dominick Vetri, Communicating Between Planets: Law Reform for
the Twenty-First Century, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 169, 177–78 (1998) (mentioning six obstacles to interbranch communication: “(1) ingrained negative
attitudes toward each other’s branch; (2) limited knowledge of each other’s institutional roles and procedures; (3) lack of a designated judicial spokesperson;
(4) conflict created by institutional checks and balances; (5) judicial caution in
approaching the legislature; and (6) lack of clear guidelines for judicial participation”).
98. See, e.g., Feedback, supra note 7, at 4 (stating that judges received
memos reminding them about the project).
99. See E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8 (suggesting
that some judges may not be aware of the project); E-mail from Russell
Wheeler, President, The Governance Inst., to author (Sept. 12, 2013, 11:53
EDT) (on file with author) (mentioning the existence of some misconceptions
about the statutory housekeeping project’s purpose and operation).
100. Judges bear the primary responsibility for selecting opinions to submit through the project in the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. E-mail from Patricia Connor, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, to author (Dec. 6, 2013, 13:11 CST) (on file with author);
Telephone Interview with Molly Dwyer, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (Dec. 16, 2013); E-mail from Thomas B. Plunkett, Chief
Deputy Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, to author
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lack of attention to the project probably best explains low participation in it. That said, given the many obligations and de101
mands upon appellate judges and their staff, judicial unawareness or inattention to the project should not be considered
proof of judicial negligence by any means.
The relative obscurity of the statutory housekeeping project can at least partly be attributed to its original design as a
102
low-visibility “transmission-belt” for opinions. The project’s
low visibility may have the advantage of making judges who
know about the project more comfortable with sending opinions
because their participation is unlikely to be publicly perceived
as criticism of Congress or as interference with that body’s leg103
islative duties. Yet, it also hampers the project’s effectiveness
by reducing judges’ exposure to it, thereby making it less likely
that the project will be meaningfully used by all of the cir104
105
cuits. Despite some awareness-raising efforts, there is some
106
evidence that judges remain unfamiliar with the project. This
suggests that such awareness-raising efforts for the housekeeping project can be significantly improved and that any suggested change to the project must be sensitive to the many obligations and responsibilities of the federal judiciary.

(Dec. 16, 2013, 15:34 CST) (on file with author); E-mail from Carol L. Trama,
Admin. Assistant to the Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, to
author (Dec. 9, 2013, 15:31 CST) (on file with author); Letter from Catherine
O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
to author (Dec. 16, 2013) (on file with author). Even in circuits where court
staff may choose which opinions to submit, judges, especially the chief judge,
usually have some input. See, e.g., E-mail from Betsy Shumaker, Clerk of
Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, to author (Dec. 10, 2013,
10:02 CST) (on file with author) (approval of three judge panel required before
opinion may be submitted); E-mail from Annette B. Young, Exec. Assistant &
Circuit Mediation Adm’r, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to author (Dec. 16, 2013, 12:38 CST) (on file with author) (Senior Staff Attorney selects with review by Chief Judge).
101. E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8 (“[A]ppellate
judges have plenty else on their minds, and it doesn’t occur to them to submit
relevant opinions.”).
102. See Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193 (describing the intended low-visibility of the project).
103. See Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 138 (“The project puts minimal burdens on the courts.”).
104. See Memorandum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 1
(breaking down judicial participation in the statutory housekeeping project).
105. See, e.g., Feedback, supra note 7, at 4.
106. See E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8; E-mail from
Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 99.
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Moreover, the project appears to be a relatively low priority
for judges and court staff. Although nearly every circuit clerk of
107
court polled has a procedure for submitting opinions, few
108
seem to avail themselves of these procedures. This seeming
inconsistency may partly be explained by circuit clerks and
staff attorneys narrowly interpreting the project’s requirements
in order to prioritize other court business. Several clerks of
court mentioned that their circuits rarely encounter opinions
that qualify for the project, suggesting that they read the statutory housekeeping project’s guidelines to only apply to especial109
ly egregious statutory flaws. These narrow interpretations of
the project’s guidelines may be a result of a lack of clarity in
the project’s guidelines or institutional pressures to limit time
spent on the project in order to attend to other court business.
Whatever the underlying reason, certain circuits’ narrow view
of the housekeeping project’s scope demonstrates that even
many of those aware of the project are rarely using it. This
suggests that judicial underuse of the housekeeping project
may be partially attributable to both a lack of prioritization
and a lack of awareness of the project.
Separation of powers concerns probably also discourage
110
participation. Such judicial reservations would be grounded
in “the combined force of constitutionally mandated separation
of powers, [judicial] codes of ethics, and a general sense of insti-

107. E-mail from Christie L. Cavanaugh, Admin. Specialist to Clerk of
Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, to author (Dec. 9, 2013,
09:22 CST) (on file with author); E-mail from Patricia Connor to author, supra
note 100; E-mail from Christopher Conway, Admin. Attorney, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to author (Dec. 6, 2013, 09:48 CST) (on file
with author); Telephone Interview with Molly Dwyer, supra note 100; Telephone Interview with Michael E. Gans, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit (Dec. 16, 2013); E-mail from Stacy Kennon, U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, to author (Dec. 10, 2013, 14:39 CST) (on
file with author); E-mail from Thomas B. Plunkett to author, supra note 100;
E-mail from Betsy Shumaker to author, supra note 100; E-mail from Carol L.
Trama to author, supra note 100; E-mail from Annette B. Young to author,
supra note 100.
108. See supra notes 79–83, 88–93 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Michael E. Gans, supra note 107;
E-mail from Betsy Shumaker to author, supra note 100 (mentioning that the
submission procedure does not come up often).
110. E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8 (“[S]ome [appellate judges] may be aware of the project but believe, despite its endorsement
by the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office, that it’s unseemly for
judges to be communicating with Congress in a way that might be perceived
as criticism.”).
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111

tutional propriety.” The Constitution prohibits judges from
issuing advisory opinions about potential bills, thereby limiting
the kinds of communications judges can make to legislators
112
about statutory defects. The constitutional separation of powers doctrine also encourages judges to avoid making statements
that might prejudice future issues that could later come before
113
them. The perceived importance of a wholly independent judiciary further encourages judges to avoid engaging in communication with Congress altogether, whether such communication is actually contrary to the constitutional principle of
separation of powers or deliberately designed to avoid such a
114
violation.
Separation of powers concerns deserve greater attention
because of the significant role they may play in discouraging
participation in the housekeeping project. Critics of the project
may believe that it upsets the well-defined constitutional roles
of the judicial and legislative branches by encouraging judicial
overreaching. A closer look at the housekeeping project reveals,
115
however, that it raises no significant constitutional problems.
The quintessential separation of powers violation involves
116
an attempt by one branch to usurp the functions of another.
Critics of the statutory housekeeping project may argue that
judges impermissibly intrude upon Congress’s domain when
they submit opinions discussing statutory flaws through the
project. According to this view of separation of powers, Con111. Shirley S. Abrahamson & Gabrielle Lessard, Interbranch Communications: The Next Generation, in CONFERENCE ON ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF
LEGISLATION ON THE WORKLOAD OF THE COURTS: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
11, 11 (A. Fletcher Mangum ed., 1995). For a brief history of interbranch
communication between the judicial and legislative branches, see Deanell
Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52 OHIO ST.
L.J. 279, 279–90 (1991) (arguing that the framers of the United States Constitution anticipated interbranch dialogue, and pointing to early examples of that
type of dialogue).
112. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792); ROBERT A.
KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS, 85 (1997); see also United Pub. Workers
of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) (“[T]he federal courts, established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, do not render advisory opinions.”).
113. KATZMANN, supra note 112, at 85; Abrahamson & Lessard, supra note
111, at 11.
114. KATZMANN, supra note 112, at 85; Abrahamson & Lessard, supra note
111, at 11.
115. See infra Part II.C.1.
116. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726–27 (1986) (discussing
the “dangers of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions”).
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gress, and not the judiciary, is responsible for examining federal statutes and determining whether they have any flaws worth
remedying.
The main problem with this criticism of the housekeeping
project is that it is based on a misunderstanding of how the
housekeeping project operates. Pursuant to their Article III authority to adjudicate cases, judges interpret statutes and write
117
opinions discussing their reasoning for those interpretations.
The housekeeping project gives judges and judicial staff a way
to transmit those reasoned judicial opinions to Congress; it does
not provide them a means to editorialize about policy mat118
ters. Judges and judicial staff participating in the project
communicate about statutory issues of mutual concern. They do
not propose bills, enact legislation, or otherwise act like legislators. Thus, to reject the housekeeping project on separation of
powers grounds is to ignore both how the project actually works
and its great potential to encourage interbranch understanding.
Judicial codes of conduct may also help explain low judicial
participation. Ethical juridical codes generally prohibit ex parte
119
limit the public comments a judge may
communications,
120
make during a pending or impending proceeding, and restrict
121
extrajudicial activity. Encouraging ethical behavior by judges
is certainly not an unreasonable goal; supporters of the housekeeping project recognize the importance of ethical judicial
122
conduct. Moreover, as the comments to Rule 3.1 of the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct point out, “Judges are uniquely qualified to engage in extrajudicial activities that concern the law,
123
the legal system, and the administration of justice . . . .” This
judicial experience is especially apparent in the area of tech-

117. See U.S. CONST. art. 3; KATZMANN, supra note 112, at 46 (“Among the
tasks judges face . . . is to construe the meaning of statutes . . . .”).
118. See Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 137 (describing the process
for submitting opinions through the statutory housekeeping project and noting
how judicial opinions are sent to Congress without substantial commentary
from judges or judicial staff).
119. Tacha, supra note 111, at 292–93.
120. Id. at 293.
121. Id. at 293–94.
122. See Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 137–38 (describing how the
statutory housekeeping project was structured to avoid the appearance of inappropriate communications by judges).
123. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (2010).
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nical statutory defects given that judges interpret statutes on a
124
daily basis.
Despite this room for interbranch communication within
ethical behavior, judicial codes of conduct functionally discourage such communication by only giving vague guidelines for
125
how to communicate with the legislative branch. In the absence of specific guidelines for interbranch communication,
“judges will continue to err on the conservative side by isolating
126
themselves from public and private debate on current issues,”
even when those issues are “not impending or pending in a case
127
before the courts.” Thus, judicial codes of conduct simultaneously leave room for judicial participation in the statutory
housekeeping project and discourage that participation by not
providing clear guidelines for what types of judicial behavior
are and are not appropriate in the realm of interbranch communication.
The low visibility of the project combined with a heavy judicial workload and institutional concerns with interbranch
communications thus combine to discourage participation.
Supplementation and expansion of the project can help deal
with those problems, encourage greater judicial participation,
improve interbranch communication, and help the project
achieve both its intended goals and broader interbranch communication objectives.
B. LEGISLATIVE USE OF THE FEDERAL STATUTORY
HOUSEKEEPING PROJECT IS NARROW IN FOCUS
On the legislative side, the federal statutory housekeeping
project is mainly used narrowly by legislative drafters to improve their drafting skills. This limited use of the project in
Congress is likely due to congressional members’ inattention to
technical statutory matters and legislative drafters’ low visibility roles. The narrow legislative use of the housekeeping project
limits its effectiveness as an interbranch communication tool.
1. Use by Legislators
Since the housekeeping project’s launch, members of Congress aware of the project have generally been receptive to it
124.
125.
126.
127.

Tacha, supra note 111, at 294.
Id. at 294–95.
Id.
Id. at 295.
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and have publicly encouraged its use. Congressional leadership
128
endorsed the project in the early 1990s when it began and the
attempted revitalization of the project in 2007 was spurred in
129
part by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Nevertheless, congressional response to problems highlighted by the
130
statutory housekeeping project has been hard to find. Congress enacted amendments to two of the provisions mentioned
131
in three of the forty-six recently submitted judicial opinions.
However, it is not clear that the amendments were spurred by
the project, and neither Congressional Legislative Counsel office is aware of any efforts by legislators to address other statu132
tory flaws described in the submitted opinions. Advocates of
the housekeeping project do not see this lack of congressional
response as a real cause for concern; in their view, the aim of
the project is to transmit opinions highlighting technical flaws
in statutes rather than to correct those flaws through statutory
133
revision.
However, limiting the project to the goal of highlighting
technical flaws rather than correcting them hinders the project’s ability to help fix gaps, ambiguities, and other technical
flaws that currently exist and may continue to cause problems
128. See Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193–94 (describing initial congressional endorsement of the statutory housekeeping project).
129. Letter from Representative John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, U.S. House
Judiciary Comm., and Representative Lamar S. Smith, Ranking Member, U.S.
House Judiciary Comm., to M. Pope Barrow, Jr., Legislative Counsel, U.S.
House Office of Legislative Counsel (May 23, 2007) (on file with author); Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm., and
Senator Arlen Specter, Ranking Republican Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary
Comm., to James Fransen, Legislative Counsel, U.S. Senate Office of Legal
Counsel (Feb. 14, 2007) (on file with author).
130. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2213; see Memorandum from Russell Wheeler
to author, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that it is unclear whether congressional
amendments to two provisions mentioned in recently submitted opinions are
attributable to the project).
131. See Memorandum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 2;
see also E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 76. This analysis of
congressional action did not directly include the four most recently submitted
opinions, but there is little reason to believe this trend of congressional inaction has not continued. See id.
132. Memorandum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 2.
133. Katzmann, supra note 10, at 692–93 (noting that the primary purpose
of the statutory housekeeping project is “not to produce legislative change”);
Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (describing how
individual congressional response is not realistic); E-mail from Russell
Wheeler to author, supra note 8 (“[The statutory housekeeping project’s] goal
is not and never was to achieve statutory revision.”).
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134

This limited transmission goal restricts the
for judges.
housekeeping project’s usefulness as a tool of interbranch
communication since it deemphasizes the two-way dialogue
135
that could result from suggestion and correction.
2. Use by Drafters
Before describing the housekeeping project’s use by legislative drafters, it is important to distinguish between policymaking and drafting. Members of Congress typically focus on policy
136
rather than the specific text of statutes. The nonpartisan,
specialized drafters in the Offices of Legislative Counsel are responsible for much of the statutory language that ends up be137
coming law. Members of Congress and their staff may decide
upon general policy concepts, outlines, or bullet points, but “the
Legislative Counsels typically turn those ideas into statutory
138
text.” This general rule similarly applies for committee staff
who frequently have their statutes checked or completely drafted by the legislative drafters in the Offices of Legislative Coun139
sel.
Because the Offices of Legislative Counsel draft the majority of statutes, their participation in the housekeeping project is
critical to its success. There is substantial evidence that legisla140
tive drafters appreciate the project. They use opinions submitted through the project to help train staff attorneys and
141
identify drafting issues to be avoided in future statutes.
Although the statutory housekeeping project’s positive impact on legislative drafting is important, the project’s narrow
focus limits its utility significantly. If the only goal of the
134. See Cardozo, supra note 12, at 115–16 (discussing the necessity of legislative action to produce lasting resolutions of ambiguities).
135. See Bellis, supra note 40, at 2214.
136. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 4, at 908.
137. Id. at 967–68.
138. Id. at 968.
139. Id. at 1020.
140. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (explaining
how the House Legislative Counsel Office finds the statutory housekeeping
project very helpful); see E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8
(mentioning the Legislative Counsel Offices’s continued support for the statutory housekeeping project).
141. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (describing
the House Legislative Counsel Office’s use of the statutory housekeeping project to train staff); see Burk, supra note 47, at 2217 (detailing the Senate Legislative Counsel Office’s use of the statutory housekeeping project to train staff
during its pilot project period).
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housekeeping project were to train staff attorneys in the Offices
of Legislative Counsel, then that goal could be furthered simply
by finding judicial opinions discussing technical flaws in statutes on electronic legal databases and using them as teaching
tools. If the housekeeping project only had that narrow goal of
training drafters, it would be much more efficient to rely on
those legal databases rather than involve courts and judges.
What sets the housekeeping project apart and gives it special significance is its ability to foster interbranch communication between Congress and the judiciary, something a simple
search in a legal database cannot do. Thus, the housekeeping
project should also focus on that broader goal through encouraging judicial submission of opinions and subsequent congressional response that would represent real two-way dialogue.
3. Reasons for the Project’s Narrow Use
A lack of direct congressional response to flaws highlighted
through the statutory housekeeping project stems largely from
congressional inattention to judicial opinions and technical
statutory matters. Members of Congress rarely read court cas142
es. When they do, they usually concern themselves with the
substantive outcomes of judicial opinions rather than with
143
Legislators and their staff are
technical drafting issues.
therefore unlikely to pay attention to the kinds of opinions
submitted through the project. Even if they do, they may be
satisfied with the judges’ interpretation, believing that they are
“making good decisions in hard cases” and see no reason for
144
congressional intervention.
Moreover, for the reasons elucidated by Pound, drafting er145
rors are unlikely to receive attention from Congress. Since
statutes revising flawed statutory language are incredibly
technical and rarely excite legislators or constituents, they are
significantly harder to pass, something especially true in the
current Congress, where passing legislation in general is a sig146
nificant challenge. These institutional barriers to congres142. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (stating
that few people in Congress ever read court cases).
143. See Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judiciary Conference of the D.C.
Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 323–24 (1989) (describing how legislative staff tend to
focus on the outcomes of court cases if they pay much attention to them at all).
144. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2213.
145. See Pound, supra note 16, at 638 (suggesting the Congressional attention to “[g]reat social questions” leaves little room for focus elsewhere).
146. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (mention-
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sional participation in the housekeeping project limit the project’s ability to actually fix the statutory problems it presents.
Though such barriers are not completely insurmountable, their
link to the culture of Congress may mean that a substantial
shift would need to occur to overcome them.
The Offices of Legislative Counsel, the bodies that probably
use the statutory housekeeping project the most of anyone in
the legislative branch, are subject to a number of institutional
constraints, such as their attorney-client relationship with leg147
islators and technical roles, which ultimately prevent them
from ensuring the effectiveness of the housekeeping project as a
two-way interbranch communication tool. Legislative drafters’
behind-the-scenes roles restrict their ability to lobby for greater
use of the project, encourage statutory revision, address more
broad-ranging inconsistencies between legislative drafting and
148
judicial interpretation of statutes, or even track what happens to opinions once they reach subcommittee and committee
149
staff. As such, legislative drafters simultaneously have one of
the best understandings of the housekeeping project and one of
the worst abilities to do much to improve or expand it. Their
narrow use of the project is limited even further by the low and
150
uneven rates of participation by the judiciary as fewer submitted opinions translates into fewer issues spotted and avoided in future drafting.
This is not meant to suggest that the institutional structure of the Offices of Legislative Counsel should be fundamentally changed. Rather, the earlier discussion highlights the
room the statutory housekeeping project has to grow while
demonstrating why legislative drafters are not well-situated to
encourage that growth. The current legislative use of the federal statutory housekeeping project narrowly benefits certain future legislative drafting, but leaves a great deal of the project’s
ing how the current political environment in Congress has made it difficult to
pass legislation).
147. See Burk, supra note 47, at 2218 (discussing how the attorney-client
relationship between the Senate Legislative Counsel’s Office and legislators
limits actions that the office can take).
148. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 4, at 930–33 (noting the inconsistency between a number of the canons of statutory construction judges use
and how statutes are actually drafted).
149. See Burk, supra note 47, at 2218 (discussing how the attorney-client
privilege between the Senate Legislative Counsel’s Office and committees limits reporting and review).
150. See supra Part II.A.1 (reviewing uneven participation rates among the
circuit courts).

SIMARD_4FMT

2015]

1/6/2015 3:25 PM

STATUTORY HOUSEKEEPING

1219

potential untapped. Indeed, the “statutory housekeeping pro151
ject” name is a misnomer given the lack of legislative action.
Since good housekeeping does not merely involve pointing out
messes today in the hopes of preventing others in the future, it
is difficult to conceive of the project today as “housekeeping”
given that no statutes have actually been “cleaned up” because
152
of it.
C. THE FEDERAL STATUTORY HOUSEKEEPING PROJECT HAS
UNMET POTENTIAL WORTH EXPLORING
Although it has yet to cause the improvements in
interbranch communication hoped for when it was launched, if
used effectively, the statutory housekeeping project has substantial promise.
1. Effective Interbranch Communication Benefits Both
Statutory Interpretation and Drafting
Interbranch communication is not only a helpful way to
keep each branch informed about the other, it can also diffuse
tensions between the legislative and judicial branches. Recent
scholarship indicates that courts have not kept pace with recent changes in legislative process, including developments in
legislative procedure, the use of staff, committee reports, and
153
lobbying practices. These changes all have implications for
statutory interpretation. Reliance on outmoded conceptions of
Congress may lead judges to misunderstand statutes through
the application of statutory interpretation techniques grounded
in assumptions about the legislative process and legislative in154
tent that are no longer accurate. On the legislative side,
members of Congress are still generally uninformed about the
judiciary’s capacity to handle its workload or on the statutory
155
interpretation problems that statutes can cause. Keeping the
151. Supra note 146 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (reviewing the original purpose of the project: improving the drafting process for future legislation).
153. Russell Carparelli, Separate Powers—Shared Responsibility: Constructing Avenues of Interbranch Communication, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 267,
270 (2007) (highlighting the importance of communication regarding evolutions within the branches of government); Vetri, supra note 97, at 178.
154. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 4, at 933–40, 967–78 (reviewing inconsistencies between canons and the drafting process, as well as misperceptions
regarding the use of legislative history).
155. Vetri, supra note 97, at 178 (noting that legislators are not kept informed about the judicial workload).
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judicial and legislative branches well-informed encourages forward-thinking drafting and statutory interpretation that better
captures legislative intent.
Aside from facilitating the sharing of information between
the legislative and judicial branches, interbranch communication can also ease tensions. The relations between judges and
156
legislators are especially tense today. Recent criticism of con157
troversial judicial decisions has been particularly harsh.
Rhetoric, “[r]eflecting anger, distrust, and misunderstanding of
the judicial process . . . tends to increase the politicization of
the judicial system . . . [and] promotes public disrespect for the
rule of law,” discouraging recognition of the judiciary as a co158
equal branch. In this environment of intense criticism of the
judiciary, building avenues of interbranch communication is
crucial to encouraging cooperation and understanding between
159
the legislative and judicial branches. While the idea of the judicial and legislative branches as being wholly isolated has a
160
judicial legitimacy is improved rather than
long history,
hampered by interbranch communication because such efforts
161
help to restore respect for that branch.
The legislative and judicial branches have a shared re162
sponsibility for the quality of statutes, a duty they can both
better fulfill when they engage in healthy dialogue.
2. The Statutory Housekeeping Project Is a Worthwhile Tool
for Enhancing Interbranch Communication
The federal statutory housekeeping project is well-situated
to facilitate the interbranch communication that is so needed
today. The housekeeping project already exists, has been endorsed by major figures from Congress and the federal judici-

156. Russell R. Wheeler & Robert A. Katzmann, A Primer on Interbranch
Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 1155, 1156–57 (2007).
157. Carparelli, supra note 153, at 269.
158. Id. at 269–70.
159. Id. at 270.
160. See, e.g., Cardozo, supra note 12, at 114 (discussing how the legislative
and judicial branches move in “proud and silent isolation”).
161. See Carparelli, supra note 153, at 270 (“[T]he vehemence of current
debate regarding the role of the courts increases the need for legislatures and
courts to build more avenues of communication and to ensure that they are
well used.”).
162. Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps
for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045,
1047 (1991).
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164

ary, and has enjoyed some use. Building upon the statutory
housekeeping project is easier than starting a new program.
The pre-existing project has also been specially tailored to
avoid the separation of powers concerns that other programs
165
may encounter.
Critics of an expansion of the housekeeping project may
argue that the project does not need to be expanded. The Offices of Legislative Counsel appreciate the housekeeping project
in its current state and have not recently suggested a need for
166
substantial change. Moreover, advocates of the project have
generally accepted its more limited scope and have not focused
on seeking congressional response to the statutory flaws pre167
sented by it. However, these arguments for keeping the statutory housekeeping project in its current state are difficult to
reconcile with the low and uneven judicial participation in the
168
project. If the housekeeping project is somewhat helpful when
it is used infrequently and unevenly by the legislative and judi169
cial branches, then supplementing and expanding the project
to increase participation will likely make it even more useful.
It is also worth noting that the project still has not addressed some of its problems first recognized during the pilot
project period, such as its unclear standards for submitting
170
171
opinions and lack of two-way communication. Adjusting the
statutory housekeeping project now may be a way to help further its goals. Since the framers of the housekeeping project
developed it in the broader context of interbranch communica172
tion and statutory revision programs, a more expansive project will not depart significantly from its original objectives
and, in fact, will help achieve them.

163. Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193–94.
164. Memorandum from Russell Wheeler, supra note 6, at 1; see also
Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2194–96 (discussing use of the project
by the D.C. Circuit during its pilot period).
165. See supra note 122.
166. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (asserting
that, from his perspective, there are no real deficiencies in the statutory
housekeeping project).
167. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
168. See Memorandum from Russell Wheeler, supra note 6, at 1; E-mail
from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 75.
169. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
170. See Burk, supra note 47, at 2218.
171. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2214.
172. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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III. IMPROVING THE STATUTORY HOUSEKEEPING
PROJECT: INSPIRATION FROM STATE PROGRAMS
The federal statutory housekeeping project’s great deal of
untapped potential as an interbranch communication tool calls
for its modification and expansion, especially in light of today’s
crucial need for better communication between Congress and
173
Existing interbranch communication
the federal judiciary.
programs in the states offer ways to improve the federal housekeeping project.
Section A of this Part describes why state interbranch
communication programs are fruitful sources of suggestions for
improving the federal statutory housekeeping project despite
the differences between state and federal legislatures and judiciaries. Section B draws on the state programs mentioned in
Section A to propose a three-pronged approach to improve the
statutory housekeeping project that involves: (1) increasing
two-way feedback between the federal judiciary and legislative
drafters within the federal project; (2) formalizing the project;
and (3) supplementing it with educational programs. While
each of these three proposals would also be helpful independently, they have the best chance of increasing the effectiveness of the statutory housekeeping project if they are implemented together.
A. STATE INTERBRANCH COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ARE
USEFUL SOURCES OF INSPIRATION FOR THE FEDERAL PROJECT
A number of interbranch communication and statutory revision programs, both formal and informal, exist in the
174
states, some of which predate the statutory housekeeping
175
project. These state interbranch communication programs,
particularly those aimed at the discovery and revision of statutory flaws, provide helpful examples for the federal statutory
173. See supra notes 157–63; see also supra Part II.C.1 (describing the benefits of interbranch communication).
174. Carparelli, supra note 153, at 270–75 (describing a number of state
and regional interbranch communication programs implemented since 1989).
For an earlier comprehensive examination of state programs of legislative discourse with the courts, see Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 162, at 1045–
93.
175. See, e.g., About the Commission, N.Y. ST. L. REVISION COMMISSION,
http://www.lawrevision.state.ny.us/index.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (noting that the New York State Revision Commission, created in 1934, “is the
oldest continuous agency in the common-law world devoted to law reform
through legislation”).
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housekeeping project. Since state interbranch communication
programs take slightly different approaches from one anoth176
er, they offer a variety of options already tested in the “labor177
atories of democracy.”
Of course, the different constitutional, structural, and political realities of state legislative and judicial branches somewhat limit a state-federal analogy in the context of interbranch
communication. For instance, some state constitutions give
their judiciaries an express duty to improve the administration
of justice that includes highlighting statutes that need to be re178
vised, while other states allow judges to give advisory opin179
ions to legislators. Concerns about judges delving too far into
the political and legislative realms may be less serious in the
180
many states that elect their judges rather than appoint them
181
as in the federal system. State legislatures also possess more
flexibility than Congress does to experiment with interbranch
communication projects, particularly legislator-judge statutory
revision committees, because they meet less often and thus legislators potentially have more time to devote to such activi182
ties. Although some state interbranch communication programs may succeed because of the aforementioned unique state
176. See Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 162, at 1051–88 (discussing
the nuances of state programs).
177. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (articulating the idea that states serve as laboratories of democracy).
178. E.g., IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 25 (laying out the system whereby state
district judges have a special duty to report “defects or omissions in the laws”
to the justices of the Idaho Supreme Court who then make an annual report
on the same topic to the governor and legislature); ILL. CONST. art.VI, § 17 (establishing an annual judicial conference for the Illinois Supreme Court justices to consider the work of the courts, suggest improvements in the administration of justice, and communicate those suggestions to the Illinois General
Assembly).
179. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Persky, “Ghosts That Slay”: A Contemporary
Look at State Advisory Opinions, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1155, 1166–72 (2005)
(providing an overview of state advisory opinion history and practice).
180. See Methods of Judicial Selection, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y,
http://www.judicialselection.com/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_
judges.cfm (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (describing the different methods of judicial selection in each state).
181. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (setting out the appointment process
for federal judges); id. art. III, § 1 (stating that federal judges have life tenure
and shall hold their offices during good behavior).
182. See Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (noting
that state legislatures are very different bodies from Congress, in part because
they meet less frequently than Congress does).
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circumstances or be unrealistic to implement on the federal
183
level, their general outlines are still useful. In fact, state pro184
grams influenced earlier proposed federal projects and provided a foundation for the statutory housekeeping project it185
These useful models, however, have been recently
self.
186
neglected by participants in the federal project. Those involved in the housekeeping project have neither drawn upon
state programs to improve the federal project nor have they
formally suggested any alternative ways to improve the housekeeping project that rival the state-based suggestions set out
187
below.
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE STATUTORY
HOUSEKEEPING PROJECT
A three-part plan to boost two-way feedback within the
federal statutory housekeeping project, increase the visibility
and formality of the project, and supplement the project with
educational programs can help the housekeeping project meet
188
its original goal of being an effective “transmission belt” and
tool of interbranch communication.
1. Boosting Two-Way Feedback
In the current housekeeping project, two-way communica189
tion between the legislative and judicial branches is slight, a
183. It is unlikely that, for example, the U.S. Constitution would be
amended to modify the separation of powers or expressly implement an
interbranch communication program. Id. (discussing the difficulty of passing a
constitutional amendment).
184. Friendly, supra note 14, at 802–04 (basing the proposed revision
committee on the New York Law Revision Commission).
185. Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judiciary Conference of the D.C. Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 317 (1989) (mentioning Maryland’s interbranch communication program).
186. See Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (mentioning that state revision and interbranch communication programs are not
participants’s major focus in the statutory housekeeping project); see also Telephone Interview with Matthew Lee Wiener, supra note 92 (mentioning that
state programs are not really on the Administrative Conference’s radar).
187. The limited attention the housekeeping project has received in recent
years focused on publicizing the project rather than formally proposing ways
to change it. See, e.g., Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 131; Katzmann,
supra note 10, at 691–92.
188. See Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193.
189. See Burk, supra note 47, at 2217–18 (mentioning a lack of clarity
about how committee staff used submitted opinions during the pilot project
period); Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (describing
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problem noted during the project’s early days. Some state
statutory revision programs encourage dialogue between judges
and legislators through revision committees that include mem191
bers of both branches. Federal notions of separation of pow192
ers and the many demands on judges’ and federal legislators’
193
time probably preclude the use of such panels, at least in the
context of statutory revision. Those state programs point, however, to the importance of making judges, court staff, legislative
drafters, and legislative policymakers feel like they are valua194
ble participants in an ongoing interbranch conversation.
One way to encourage communication without deviating
too wildly from the statutory housekeeping project’s original fo195
cus as a “transmission belt” would be to develop a second
transmission system and make information about judicial participation in the project more accessible to both branches. Legislative drafters, committee staff, and other members of the legislative branch who choose to participate would submit
information, briefly summarized on an annual or semi-annual
basis, about what they did with opinions submitted through the
statutory housekeeping project to the federal judiciary and to
each other. This second transmission system would help shed
light on how submitted opinions are handled. If reporting in the
second transmission belt shows tangible results of submitting
opinions it could also encourage judicial participation in and
196
prioritization of the housekeeping project. Even if the second
transmission system reveals that legislative staff are not using
the opinions or do not find certain aspects of the housekeeping
project helpful, it could pinpoint areas for improvement in the

how submitted opinions are transmitted to subcommittee staff).
190. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2214.
191. See, e.g., Connecticut Law Revision Commission, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.cga.ct.gov/lrc (last visited Nov. 17, 2014); Oregon Law Commission, WILLAMETTE U. C. OF L., http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/centers/olc
(last visited Nov. 17, 2014); Welcome to the Alabama Law Institute, ALA. L.
INST., http://www.ali.state.al.us (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
192. See Abrahamson & Lessard, supra note 111, at 11 (describing the influence of separation of powers on judges’ concerns about the appropriateness
of interbranch communication).
193. See E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8; supra notes
16, 145 and accompanying text.
194. Carparelli, supra note 153, at 270.
195. See Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193.
196. See supra notes 107–10 and accompanying text.
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project that would otherwise be unknown to other participants
197
in the project such as judges and judicial staff.
Greater accessibility to information about which opinions
have been submitted through the housekeeping project would
assist this second transmission belt by better informing those
in Congress. Thus, a second transmission system should be accompanied by reports about the nature of judicial participation
in the housekeeping project by the Administrative Office of the
198
U.S. Courts publicly available on its website.
Those with knowledge of the low judicial and legislative
participation in the housekeeping project may claim that a second transmission system would be unhelpful because it would
add more work for potential participants without ensuring increased participation. In isolation, this might be true; however,
199
200
the formal statute and educational programs discussed below would be aimed at boosting both the rate and quality of
participation in the housekeeping project.
A second transmission system would capitalize on that increased participation by giving those on the legislative side a
means to communicate with the federal judiciary on a more
201
equal basis. It would also help clarify what impact the submitted opinions do or do not have in Congress and improve the
202
availability of information about the project.
2. Increasing the Visibility and Formality of the Project
Further formalizing the housekeeping project through a
statutory enactment of the project may help encourage judges
197. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2214 (describing the lack of communication
from Congress back to the judiciary).
198. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts is a natural choice for
reporting on the housekeeping project on the judicial side since it already performs annual reports on the federal courts, including the judicial business of
the U.S. Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Annual Report of the Director 2013, ADMIN.
OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2013.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (describing the annual
report on the judicial business of federal courts in 2013). Given that the General Counsel of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts receives opinions
submitted through the project, it also should not be too difficult for it to make
reports about judicial participation in the housekeeping project, especially if it
enlists the help of the Governance Institute. See Katzmann & Wheeler, supra
note 1, at 137 (describing the role of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts in the statutory housekeeping project).
199. See infra Part III.B.2.
200. See infra Part III.B.3.
201. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 189.
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and court staff to participate by boosting its visibility and reassuring those who are uneasy about taking part. While a statute
will not rid judges and court staff of their many responsibilities,
it may help them prioritize the project by giving it more credibility and attention. Many state statutory revision and
interbranch communication programs are based on statutory or
203
to which administrators of those
constitutional authority,
programs can point if their legitimacy or propriety is ques204
tioned. A statute formally authorizing the statutory housekeeping project could encourage judges and court staff to participate by reassuring them that the project is a permitted form
of communication with Congress. It also comes with the added
benefit of clarifying often unclear rules about interbranch
communication that tend to discourage judges from participat205
ing.
Critics of such a broad authorizing statute may argue that
the lack of judicial participation in the housekeeping project
calls for a stricter statute that would include enforcement
mechanisms for circuits that do not actively participate. Although such a statute would likely draw judicial attention to the
project, sanctions against non-participating circuits would be
206
against the spirit of free interbranch dialogue and may present separation of powers issues not implicated by a voluntary
project formalized through a flexible statute. The political reali207
ty of Congress today, and legislators’ general inattention to
208
technical statutory matters, may make the enactment of any
statute difficult, especially one that would require significant
enforcement efforts or sophisticated drafting.
203. See supra notes 174, 178 and accompanying text.
204. The statutory authority for state interbranch communication and revision programs is often listed prominently on their websites. See, e.g., Michigan Law Revision Commission, MICH. LEGIS. COUNCIL, http://council
.legislature.mi.gov/CouncilAdministrator/mlrc (last visited Nov. 17, 2014);
Connecticut Law Revision Commission, supra note 191; Oregon Law Commission, supra note 191; Welcome to the Alabama Law Institute, supra note 191.
205. Tacha, supra note 111, at 295 (“Perhaps judges would be less wary
[about interbranch communication] if specific interactions could be measured
against guiding principles that take into account the relevant constraints but
still encourage communication.”).
206. For example, it is difficult to see how Congress’s sanctioning of circuits
that do not actively participate would ease tensions between the judicial and
legislative branches. See supra notes 157–63 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 146 (describing how difficult it is to pass legislation in
the current Congress).
208. See supra note 145 (discussing how members of Congress tend to focus
on more emotional and less technical issues).
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Though the barriers to enacting a technical statute may
make formally authorizing the statutory housekeeping project
less feasible than the two other suggestions for reforming the
housekeeping project, a statute would greatly help the other
two reforms by boosting the project’s visibility and credibility.
3. Supplementing the Project with Educational Programs
Though educational programs need not be expressly tied to
the housekeeping project, federal legislative-judicial symposiums and trainings are a helpful way to improve each branch’s
understanding of the other’s approach to statutes, thereby facilitating a more nuanced use of the federal project. Wisconsin
has been a leader in interbranch relations educational projects
on the state level, employing several different programs, including direct meetings between its Supreme Court and legislature’s judiciary committees and legislative-judicial symposiums,
one
of
which
expressly
discussed
statutory
209
interpretation. The Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, the Director of State Courts, and the Supreme Court’s
Legislative Liaison have also spoken during legislator orientation sessions about how the court works and how judges inter210
pret statutes and some legislators have seen how judges op211
erate firsthand through “Judicial Ride-Alongs.”
Interbranch educational programs on the federal level
could be helpful even if they are less expansive than those in
Wisconsin. Adding the topic of statutory drafting to the Federal
212
Judicial Center’s existing judge and court staff orientations
and developing trainings for legislative staff regarding how
federal judges interpret statutes may go a long way toward increasing understanding without requiring major disruptions of
213
either branch. Such trainings would be especially useful for
addressing gaps in knowledge about each branch if they fea209. E-mail from Nancy Rottier, Legislative Liaison, Wis. Supreme Court,
to author (Sept. 27, 2013, 17:34 CDT) (on file with author).
210. Id.
211. In the “Judicial Ride-Along” program, legislators spend half of one day
on the bench with a circuit judge from their district. Interbranch Communication: The Wisconsin Plan, WISCONSIN COURT SYSTEM (Dec. 2012), http://www
.wicourts.gov/courts/resources/docs/communications.pdf.
212. See Educational Programs & Materials, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://
www.fjc.gov (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (listing educational programs the FJC
already organizes for federal judges and court staff).
213. The federal statutory housekeeping project’s minimal burdens on its
participants has been touted as one of its major strengths. See Katzmann &
Wheeler, supra note 1, at 138.
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tured either retired or current members of the other branch,
just as a former justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court led
that state’s legislative-judicial symposium on statutory inter214
pretation. Greater understanding on the part of both branches resulting from those educational programs would make them
a useful supplement to the statutory housekeeping project that
may help remedy problems of underuse.
Although such supplemental educational programs, a federal statute, and a two-way feedback mechanism each independently offer a way to improve and expand the federal statutory housekeeping project, they work best together. The
increased visibility and credibility that a federal statute could
bring would help boost participation in the second feedback
mechanism, participation made more meaningful by education
programs that allow participants to better understand the nuances of the other branch. As such, these three suggestions
215
should ideally be implemented together as a three-part plan.
CONCLUSION
Even though statutes dominate many areas of law today,
legislators and judges are not on the same page. High tensions
between the two branches merely compound that problem. In
these circumstances the federal statutory housekeeping project’s unique statutory communication focus gives it renewed
and added importance. Yet, judicial and legislative participation in that project has not met the need for interbranch communication. Those who are familiar with the statutory housekeeping project tend to find the opinions submitted through the
project helpful but few are using it. The project remains full of
unrealized potential as a tool for interbranch communication.
An examination of a number of state interbranch communication and statutory revision programs offers a source of inspiration for how to improve the federal statutory housekeeping
project. Modifying and supplementing that project through a
second transmission system, an authority granting statute, and
interbranch educational programs can help the statutory
housekeeping project achieve its original goals and better
bridge the gap between judicial and legislative understandings
of statute drafting and interpretation. The benefits this three-

214. E-mail from Nancy Rottier to author, supra note 209.
215. As noted above, the formalizing statute may be more difficult to implement than the other two proposals. See supra notes 207–09.
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part plan will bring are potentially far reaching; an effective
federal statutory housekeeping project is well-situated to promote interbranch communication and understanding, which is
of vital importance in a legal system dominated by statutes.

